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ALWAYS UNDER LAW?
Frank 1 Michelman*
INTRODUCTION
This essay is adapted, with some stylistic and organizational
but little material change, from my Dewey Lecture entitled "Layers of Law," given at the University of Minnesota Law School on
November 14, 1994.t In a prior work, I had argued that one cannot cleave wholeheartedly and simultaneously to both of the two
ideal notions of higher law and popular sovereignty, without conceiving that the popular sovereign conducts its higher lawmaking
in a normative spirit that I called jurisgenerative.z I began the
present work with an aim of turning the previous argument
around. Agreeing with the many who assign to the notion of
popular sovereignty, as that notion figures in constitutional-democratic political thought, an evocative or idealizing or quasimythical status, I wanted to suggest something about this notion's function in our political thought. Although "popular sovereignty" is perhaps more often taken to express the idea that the
people have the right to make the law be whatever in fact they
decide, no further questions asked, I wanted to suggest that this
notion's deeper signification is the expression of a wish to believe
something opposite: that whoever at any time actually does lay
* Robert Walmsley Professor of Law, Harvard University. Copyright© 1995 by
Frank I. Michelman.
1. This remains an exploratory and speculative piece, in keeping with the spirit of
this journal. Under advice (let us call it) from the editors, I have held footnote citations
to the barest minimum. Nevertheless, I owe many intellectual debts, including but certainly not limited to Pierre Schlag and Steven Wmter for both their published writings
and their comments on this draft; to Frank Goodman, Samuel Freeman, Heidi Hurd, and
Howard Lesnick for comments at and following a workshop session at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School; to Martin Flaherty and James Fleming for comments on a previous draft; and to various contributors to Sanford Levinson's recent collection of essays
on higher lawmaking (which I've been studying closely in a course I am currently teaching), Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment (Princeton U. Press, 1995); and to students in that course. To
several trenchant commentators at the N.Y.U. Colloquium on Constitutional Theory and
at a discussion sponsored by the editors of the journal Constellotions, I wish to say that
there was not time to make this piece reflect what I learned from our sessions before it
had to go to press. This work is not finished yet.
2. Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, rrJ Yale LJ. 1493, 1499-1503 (1988).
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down higher law to the country does so in a spirit of answering to
some commonly and publicly perceived or commonly and publicly derivable standard of right.3 I don't know whether the essay
as it now stands delivers on the stated aim. In the final section,
added after I gave the lecture, the argument takes a tum I hadn't
at all anticipated when I began.
I. THE THESIS STATED

How do we think our scheme of government is justified?
This is not a simple question, at least not as I intend it, and I

have to begin by explaining what I mean by it.
Start with the phrase "our scheme of government." By this I
mean something quite broadly defined, roughly what John Rawls
seems to mean when he speaks of constitutional democracy.4 I
shall use that term, and I shall mean by it our familiar broad
model of a liberal-individualist political order based on higher
law, representative government, and popular sovereignty. That's
not as innocuous as you might think, though, for I mean "constitutional democracy" to signify commitment in full earnest to all
three of those familiar defining terms. And it may strike you, as
I thus lay them down-as very likely it has struck you beforethat these three commonplace terms of the constitutional-democratic confession are not self-evidently harmonious. "Higher
law" seems in some way to stand against both popular sovereignty and representative government. As for the latter pair,
"popular sovereignty" speaks of government not only for the
people but by them, and that is not obviously the same thing as
government of them by officials or representatives. Sorting out
some of the relations among these regulative notions, especially
those between higher law and popular sovereignty, while trying
always to keep faith with each as regulative, will be a part of my
business here.
I approach this sorting out though the question I've already
put: How do we think constitutional-democratic government is
justified? Now, you might say right off, maybe not everyone
3. Needless, I hope, to add: The sight of someone expressing through myth a wish
or belief in something's being the case is most definitely not a sign that the ideal something is the case or even is believed to be. It could well be the converse: a sign of suspicion and concern that it isn't and perhaps can't ever be quite so. Nevertheless, one might
question whether indulgence in the quasi-mythology of popular sovereignty, with its inevitable insinuation (as I believe) of an existent fact of morally responsible government, is
an altogether healthy way for a country to express a sense either of political ideals or of
performative shortfall from them.
4. John Rawls, Political Liberalism xvi, xviii & passim (Colum. U. Press, 1993).
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thinks it is; so who is this "we" of whom I speak so complacently?
I could give you the innocuous, the disarming response. I could
say that in speaking here of "we" I just mean whoever reading
this does in fact incline to the belief that constitutional democracy is probably the right (or, if you prefer, the best) broad
model for a scheme of government for their society. But actually
I intend something a little more contentious. I say "we" suspecting that you, reader, at least some of the time, believe in the
probable rightness (or best-ness), for your society, of constitutional democracy in some recognizable form (although perhaps
not exactly the form in which it's currently prescribed and practiced in your country).s
So ... How do you think-how do we think-constitutional
democracy is justified? In casting this in terms of "how do we
think," I'm not intending to pose an issue in normative political
theory. I'm not inviting answers of the form: a substantively sufficient justification of constitutional democracy is (say) the argument set forth by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice.6 I'm
intending rather to pose a question about facts of constitutionaldemocratic thought-about how, in fact, we think about government, bearing in mind that one fact about how we think about it
could very well be this: that we think about it in ways that are
themselves counterfactual-idealizing, imaginative, utopianmaybe more so than we usually notice or admit. Accordingly,
the inquiry here is meant as descriptive, not prescriptive. Its
form is that of exposition. It is an effort to catch hold of, to look
into, habitual thoughtways and conceptualizations that enter quietly and unselfconsciously, but also perhaps problematically, into
people's largely unexamined convictions that constitutional democracy is an apt broad model for schemes of political justice for
a society of beings conditioned and situated as we every-daily
think we are.
I'll begin by proposing a thesis in this expositive vein (one
that standing by itself may not seem very surprising) that we can
call the always-under-law thesis. In order to set forth the thesis, I
need to stipulate a couple of definitions. Let us, therefore, understand "constitutional essentials" (I draw the term from John
Rawls) to mean legal provisions for the structure and process of
5. I expect it will tum out for some readers that you will start to think, as you work
your way through what follows, that you are not a constitutional democrat in my sense,
because you find me taking too much in earnest either the popular-sovereignty or the
higher-law commitment posed by the model. Nevertheless, I ask you: Are you really
prepared to subordinate either of those commitments to the other?
6. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press, 1971).
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government-votes and elections, allocations of powers among
branches and offices, and so forth-and also for limitations upon
government, for "rights and liberties of citizenship that [government is] bound to respect."7 And let us, further, define "higher
lawmaking" as any of (i) legislation of a country's scheme of constitutional essentials,s or (ii) legislation of standards to govern
type (i) lawmaking, or (iii) legislation of standards to govern type
(ii) lawmaking, or (iv) ... etc. ad inf (So type (n) lawmaking is
always "higher" than type (n-1).) Then the expositive "alwaysunder-law thesis" is this: Constitutional-democratic thought is always taking for granted that whoever is engaged in higher lawmaking for a country (and I don't care how high up the (n)s you
want to go) is, in that engagement, answering to some still higher
law that is already there, in place; for every (n) there is an (n+l).
Constitutional democrats take this for granted insomuch as (a)
we think that only if it's so can our scheme of government be
justified, and (b) we think our scheme of government is justified.
In constitutional-democratic political thought, then, higher
lawmaking is a matter of law-all-the-way-up. Despite that titillatingly paradoxical formulation, though, the always-under-law-thesis may very well be renderable in a way that makes it
unsurprising. Consider a body of thought that posits a set of abstract, universal, human ("natural") rights, such that a scheme of
constitutional essentials that fails to secure these is, in this body
of thought, ipso facto unjustified. The always-under-law thesis
can, I think, be shown to hold for this body of thought.9 But this
is a common form of constitutionalist thought. So why be surprised at the thesis?
It is we democratic constitutionalists-we consitutional democrats-for whom the thesis is problematic. For us, while higher
7. Rawls, Political Liberalism at 227 (cited in note 4).
8. We could perhaps better define type (i) higher lawmaking as that which is addressed to the slightly broader domain that Rawls calls political "fundamentals," see id. at
214-15, which takes in, in addition to constitutional essentials, "questions of basic [distributive] justice," see id. at 214, 228-29, but this refinement is unnecessary for our purposes
here.
9. As applied to it, the thesis could mean something like this: The ledger of abstract-universal natural rights is underdetenninative for concrete schemes of constitutional essentials because, depending on local historical, cultural, etc. conditions, there are
various such schemes that can satisfy this (natural-right-fulfilling) criterion of justification.
But this is true, as well, for intermediate sets of standards (still locally variant but decreasingly so) to govern selection among concrete constitutional schemes, or (moving up the
scale of abstraction-universality) for selecting among more locally variant, less abstractuniversal, sets of standards. At higher and higher levels, these increasingly abstract-universal sets of standards (to govern selection among lower-level sets of standards) approach asymptotically, without ever reaching, the ultimate abstract-universal-the at-thelast ineffably abstract and universal-ledger of natural rights.
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law may be a regulative notion, no less so is popular sovereignty.
And the always-under-law thesis is paradoxical when extended,
as I'm going to insist constitutional-democratic thought has to do,
to the case of higher lawmaking by a sovereign people. In fact,
the result of this extension is a double, a two-faced paradox: a
contradiction of the sovereign character of the self-governing
people combined with a contradiction of the politics-transcending character of the higher law.
We commonly take the idea of the sovereignty of the people
to imply that the collective will of the governed (somehow-orother gauged and expressed) strictly constitutes the highest law of
the state. Popular sovereignty, in other words, we commonly take
to imply that the people acting to resolve their country's higher
law cannot then themselves be acting under the sign of law. The
people's sovereign act of higher lawmaking law must itself, as
sovereign, be above and beyond all law. That, I say, is how we
usually think we think about popular sovereignty. The alwaysunder-law thesis, however, contradicts this ordinarily unreflective
take on how participants in constitutional democracy think about
the provenance of higher law. Part III of this essay is meant to
show that constitutional democrats conceive higher lawmaking to
be always under law, even when the higher lawmakers are the
people themselves. At the same time, though, and correlatively,
the exposition shows that, in constitutional-democratic thought,
the law that even the highest politics is under is itself a politically
immanent creation, not a deliverance of transcendent, transpolitical reason.
The exposition will carry us into some familiar puzzles about
who or what we have in view when speaking of a sovereign "People." Few, after all, would defend literally the proposition that
the terms of government are ever actually set by an active, express, affirmative consensus of the entirety of a country's politically franchised population. One needn't dismiss popular
sovereignty as a fiat-out lie (and I wouldn't) in order to see that
this can hardly be a term of scientific description of real-world
politics. Popular sovereignty is surely in some part a mythic idea,
one whose function is as much evocative or expressive as it is
descriptive.
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II. FROM POLIDCAL JUSTIFICATION TO
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW
A.

JUSTIFICATION

What we're trying to do here is to have a look at ourselves
thinking, when what we're thinking about is how a certain something is justified. What that something is we'll soon be discussing, but perhaps we had first better ask: But what is
"justification," anyway? All I mean by the term is something
aptly said in response to complaint. Look at it this way: No matter who we are, we inevitably from time to time experience government as an external force, an intervention in our lives. So
there is always and everywhere the potential for complaint
against government. Justification is what can be said to allay
such complaint, actual or potential. Constitutional democrats
think we can often allay complaints against specific acts of government by showing how these issued properly from a scheme of
government-a scheme of constitutional essentials-that itself
measures up to a set of general normative requirements for
schemes of this kind.
B.

HIGHER LAW

In what I just wrote, you see in action one of the typical
arrangings of constitutional-democratic political thought. This
thought-our thought-arranges acts of political ordering in a
two-place hierarchy. In the first place, there are schemes of government ("constitutions"). In the second place there are (issuing
from the constitution in force), "ordinary" political acts of legislation, administration, and adjudication.lo
Expectant upon any detection of an intentional act of political ordering is a question of justification. Constitutional-democratic thought divides the question of justification for enactment
of a scheme of government from that of justification for any
subordinate, ordinary governmental act. Suppose we say that to
justify directly a political act is to show the correspondence of this
very act (not just some higher-level act that authorized this one)
to ideals of justice or conduciveness to general human goods.u
10. Of course a constitutional scheme may prescribe hierarchical orderings among
the varieties of ordinary acts it authorizes and organizes, but these subordinate hierarchies need not concern us here.
11. I'm trying to stay noncommittal here as between deontological and consequentialist modalities of political-moral evaluation. A higher-law scheme's expected consequences bear on its (dis)justification just insofar as one's moral view makes the
consequences count for evaluations of this kind.
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In constitutional-democratic political thought, demands for direct justification are principally directed to the scheme of constitutional essentials; "ordinary" acts of government we are usually
content to justify indirectly, by verifying that they have issued
properly from an accepted scheme of constitutional essentials.t2
We may think a particular tax, for example, is bad policy or even
in some degree unjust; but if the tax was imposed by a law issuing
properly from an accepted scheme of constitutional essentials,
then we accept coercive collection of the tax as (at least prima
facie) justified. We allow the governmental product to inherit
justification from a supposedly justified constitutional scheme.t3
"Higher lawmaking" in these pages means lawmaking addressed to the scheme of constitutional essentials, the scheme
whose justified character (supposing it has one) is thought to be
inheritable by specific acts of government that issue from it. It is
specifically this kind of higher lawmaking action that, I claim,
constitutional-democratic thought must treat as always directly
answering to some pre-existing, publicly ascertainable (and also,
as matters will develop, politically grounded or immanent) standard of right or good. Which claim is, of course, the nub of my
answer to the question I posed at the beginning: How do we
think our scheme of government is justified?
C.

REASONS OF THE GOVERNED

I have to say something, now, about how constitutionaldemocratic thought tends to approach the question of standards
of rightness and goodness for higher-law schemes. So consider
this: Sometimes (not all of the time, I hope for your sake) your
thoughts may tum to questions of the justifiability of basic political arrangements, schemes of constitutional essentials. At those
times, I expect, you see your social world as populated by per12. I say "principally" and "usually" because there's also in this thought the sense
that a scheme of constitutional essentials may itself call-and perhaps, in order to be
itself justified, it must call-for direct moral justification of certain classes of specific acts
of government. For example, it's widely held that among the regnant American constitutional essentials is a requirement that the enacted procedures leading to certain kinds of
deprivations be fundamentally fair. The point is that we don't think schemes of constitutional essentials must, in order to be justified, always or sweepingly impose such requirements and when they don't it's to their own putatively justified character that we look to
justify the concrete acts that issue from them. (For example, this is how most American
observers have been recently accustomed to treat most aspects of legislation dealing with
labor relations, trade regulation, and taxation.)
13. This duality of scheme and product bears comparison with other big dualisms
that are recurrent in liberal political thought: process versus substance, the right versus
the good, law versus politics, constitutional (or deliberative) versus ordinary (or strategic)
politics.
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sons who are conscious and regardful of themselves both as individuals and as what philosophers call "subjects." This means you
then see yourself and others as individuals severally possessed of
minds and lives of their own and severally possessed, furthermore, of worthwhile (not to say supremely worthwhile) capacities for taking some substantial degree of charge of their own
minds and lives, making and pursuing their own judgments about
what to do, what to strive for, what is good, and what is right.
These attributions to persons of individualized self-possession
and subjectivity are certainly challengeable. It's not hard in our
age to stir up philosophic or psychoanalytic or social-theoretic
doubts about them. These doubts, however, do not usually seem
to stop most of us from making precisely such attributions, virtually automatically, at the times when we are thinking practically
about matters of political justice.t4
It seems to me clear, at any rate, that a view of persons as
individual subjects strongly shapes constitutional-democratic
thought about constitutional justification. This view of persons
prompts a certain sense of what it must mean to defend against
imaginable complaint the intrusions and constraints of government in people's lives. Justification then must include, at a minimum, a showing that all of the affected subjects-all of the
persons subject to the range of governmental actions in question-have what are actually, for them (whether they appreciate
this at the moment or not), good reasons to consent to the
scheme of constitutional essentials from which the actions issue.
I intend what I've said to this point as a rather modest and
unsurprising claim about the form of constitutional-democratic
political thought. I've so far said only that, for each of us (qua
constitutional democrat), a minimum condition for higher law
justification is our own readiness to attribute to all affected subjects a set of reasons for consent to the scheme of government
that we somehow manage to see as both "theirs" and "good."
This sense that schemes of constitutional essentials are justifiable
only by appeal to reasons aptly attributable to all affected persons is, I am saying, deeply present in constitutional-democratic
political thought. I am going to call this the demand for justification by reasons-of-the-governed.
14. I'm speaking here, as many will doubtless see, of what John Rawls calls a political conception of justice and the person. See Rawls, Polilh:al Liberalism at 11-22, 29-35
(cited in note 4). Whether there are good grounds for resisting the impulse I describe, or
for regarding it as pathological, is beside the point of this essay. See Frank I. Michelman,
The Subject of Liberalism (book review), 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1807, 1809-10 (1994) (briefly
describing controversy over this matter).
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Justification by reasons-of-the-governed is a relatively weak
demand-at least by comparison with a further justificatory demand, for government under law, which I am about to claim is
also a fixture in constitutional-democratic political thought. Getting clear the difference between the two demands is the next
step in my exposition.

D.

GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW

Imagine, if you will, a country governed by officials organized as legislative assemblies, executive agencies, and courts of
law. Acts of government by these officials can frequently have
important, shaping impacts on the operative content of the country's higher-law scheme of constitutional essentials. Official acts
may resolve what had theretofore been open or contested questions regarding that operative content, or they may in some other
way help redetermine or modify that content.
It will help to have before us an illustrative higher-law controversy to which we can refer from time to time, preferably one
with which everyone is thoroughly familiar. So go back with me
to New Years Day, 1973, prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Roe v. Wade. As of that time, the question of constitutional
protection (in any degree) for a woman's freedom to control the
course of a pregnancy was by no means resolved in the affirmative. It was an open question of higher law, in the clear sense
that respectable arguments appealing to higher law principle and
precedent were available to presumptively sincere contestants on
both sides.
This then-open question of higher law might conceivably
have been resolved by a formal constitutional amendment, enacted by supermajorities of Congress and state legislatures as
provided by Article V of the Constitution-for example, a
"human life" amendment declaring a fetus from the moment of
conception to be a constitutionally cognizable "person." Most of
us allow, though, that inevitably there are other avenues than
formal amendment to resolutions of many open or contested
questions of higher-law meanings. We see, in fact, how the concretely operative scheme of constitutional essentials undergoes
some degree of redetermination or modification whenever, as
frequently happens, judges or other public officials have occasion
to interpret the scheme in the course of carrying out their duties
under it. Which, of course, is what rather dramatically happened
in a series of decisions by the Supreme Court running from, let us
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say, Griswold v. Connecticutts to Planned Parenthood v. Caseyt6;
a series which, by the prevailing account in Casey, has now made
it settled higher law in this country-a settled component of our
operative scheme of constitutional essentials-that women's
freedom of reproductive choice during pregnancy enjoys a certain measure of protection against government.
So we're focused now on the class of official acts by which
office-holders (a class in which I include judges) resolve or modify the operative content of extant higher law. And I ask you
now to suppose with me that whenever any member of any official body commits one of these acts that has an effect of resolving
or modifying the operative scheme of constitutional essentials, or
contributes toward an act having such an effect (for example, by
casting a vote), these officials always, each and every time, each
and every one, act sincerely in accord with what they severally,
just then, see as good reasons for consent attributable to all of
the governed.
But now suppose, further, that the reasons are disorganized,
in the following way. The various officials don't always all concurrently attribute the same set of underlying reasons for consent. In fact, they can frequently be found attributing various
different sets of reasons, having diverse and conflicting implications for contested questions of higher-law meaning and content.
What is more, individual officials don't reliably attribute the
same or even evidently consistent sets of reasons from one day to
the next, from one official act to the next.17
Whatever you might find worrisome about this sort of situation, it's not that any official is ever, on any given occasion, failing to cite plausible reasons-of-the-governed to justify his or her
exercise of power. The problem is not a want of cited reasons but
rather a surplus. This surplus of cited reasons defines the difference between the demand for justification by reasons-of-the-governed and the demand for government under law.
15. 381 u.s. 479 (1965).
16. 112 s. a. 2791 (1992).
17. Constitutional lawyers are wearily familiar with such disorganization, but here is
an illustration to convey the idea. Yesterday, Judge A voted to uphold against constitutional challenge a law flatly prohibiting abortions. The judge reasoned that the law carries out a commitment lying at the core of people's reasons for consent to the scheme of
government, namely, to protect the powerless against abuse by the powerful. Today,
Judge A rejects (or yesterday, Judge B rejected) a child's claim to a constitutional right to
the government's protection against parental violence. The judge reasoned that granting
the claim would contradict a commitment lying at the core of people's reasons for consent
to the scheme of government, namely, to protect individual liberty and privacy against
majoritarian oppression.
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The demand for government under law is the demand for
consistent regulation, by some public and unified set of durable,
antecedently binding principles of justice and right, of all determi-

nations, interpretations, and resolutions of a political society's
operative scheme of constitutional essentials. There is an evident
logic behind this demand, and it flows once again from that minimum condition for constitutional justification that I've previously
laid before you: that is, attribution to all affected persons of a set
of good reasons of their own for consent to the scheme of
government.
To see the logic, all you have to do is bear in mind two
things: One, what has to be justified is something concrete: an
actual, on-going scheme of constitutional essentials, an historically specific, coherently identifiable practice of government.
1\vo, the "subjects" of this justification-the putative holders of
reasons for consent-are similarly concrete; they are the living,
breathing members of the population of the country, all of whom
stand exposed to the powers authorized by this one, actually operative scheme. Constitutional-democratic political justification
must, then, concretely consist in establishment of a set of reasons
why this people (these people)-in their conditions as they make
them out given their ways of understanding self, freedom, society, and value-can rationally see they have for submitting to the
actual scheme in force over them.ts
It is this concreteness of the demand for justification by reasons-of-the-governed that explains the demand for a law for government to be under-meaning by "law" a set, a sensibly unified
and consistent set, of public, durable, antecedently binding principles to govern all determinations regarding the constitutional
essentials. The demands for unity, publicity, durability, and
antecedence-in a word, for lawness-are there because to permit power-wielding officials to resolve or modify the constitutional essentials on the fly (so to speak), free of obligation to
conform their resolutions to a unified set of extant, publicly established standards, would be, in effect, to set loose the exercise
of governmental power from any actual set of reasons the actual
people could really have for supporting the scheme of government to which they are subject.

18. I'm not here making an anti-unversalist, pro-particularist (historicist, relativist)
claim. The argument holds regardless of what we say about the samenesses or differences
among people(s) in the respects pertinent to judgments of the rightness or best-ness of a
scheme of government for them.
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In sum: For constitutional democrats, the moral defensibility
of an actual practice of government must depend on conscious
resolution within (or for) the sponsoring society of some set of
enduring and contentful principles of constraint on government-principles expressing the reasons that a people are supposed to have for submitting to this scheme of government.
These principles, then, will stand as fundamental-central, definitive, constitutive-for the political order in question, the pledge
of its morally justified character. What all this amounts to is that
justified constitutional-democratic government must be government "under law."
III. THE SELF-GOVERNING PEOPLE
At this stage of the exposition, the task is to face up as directly as we can to the fact, and its implications, that constitutional democrats hold the notion of popular sovereigntygovernment of the people by themselves-to be fully regulative
for constitutional democracy, on a plane with the notion of
higher law. This is what's so intriguing about constitutionalism of
the democratic kind: how we try to maintain the demand that the
government act under a higher law while at the same time always
tying this higher law's validity to the democratic acts of a political
society or "people."
Part II traced a logical path from a demand for justification
of government by reasons of the governed to a demand for government under law. Suppose, now, that we can also confirm
something that I've already intimated (and that may seem highly
plausible on its face): that the laying down to a country of a
scheme of constitutional essentials is itself an act of government.
At that point, if we safely reach it, we'll have established the always-under-law thesis. Won't we?
For remember what the thesis is. The thesis is-to restate it
verbatim-that it's a constant (if usually unspoken) premise in
constitutional-democratic political thought that "whoever is engaged in higher lawmaking for a country (and I don't care how
high up the (n)s you want to go) is, in that engagement, answering to some still higher law that is already there, in place." And
isn't that established if we've confirmed: (1) that the demand that
government be under law is a constant in constitutional-democratic political thought, and (2) that acts of higher lawmaking are
acts of government?
But hang on a minute, you may say. The argument, you may
say, runs into a special complication in the case we're consider-
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ing, by reason of the special identification in this case of the
higher lawgiver with the people themselves. Prescription of
higher law by a people to themselves, you may say, just is not the
kind of act or event to which the logic of the demand for government under law is applicable.
After all, the reasons a people have or consider themselves
to have for submitting to a scheme of government may not be
fixed once and for all. It seems likelier that these would be
changeable over time, in ways that would call for corresponding
change in the operative scheme of constitutional essentials. Of
course, it doesn't necessarily follow that it has to be the people
themselves who decide when a change in their reasons requires
change in their operative political constitution; self-government
is a normative choice or ideal, not {politically speaking) a logical
necessity.19 Deep democrats may demand to know who betterwho other-than the people themselves should or even can determine when their reasons have changed, and in what ways, and
what needs to be done by way of constitutional alteration to take
due account of whatever change in reasons has occurred. But
whatever one says about that question, there will remain a formidable challenge to the claim for extension of the always-underlaw thesis to the case of higher lawmaking by the people themselves: Supposing, as popular-sovereignty theory calls us to do,
that the decider of these questions about the people's reasons is
the people themselves, are these not then matters of a sort that
logically must be exempt from any "under law" requirement?
The challenge is apt. The logical path we traced from "reasons of the governed" to "always under law" does, indeed, seem
to run out when the higher lawmakers are conceived to be the
governed themselves. If, then, the always-under-law thesis does
extend to this case of self-government by the people, it must do
so for additional reasons. Now, additional reasons for making
the extension do, in fact, exist. While it is arguable that such
reasons are already contained in the very idea of self-government,2o I want to take a somewhat different tack here and suggest that they arise from the conceptual need to confer an
identity on "the People" that is continuous across an event of
higher lawmaking, leaving them the same People after as they
19. Philosophically speaking is another matter: whether, for example, there can be
(individual) freedom without (political, popular) self-government "all the way up." But
that is not the chosen topic of this essay.
20. See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L
Rev. 4, 25-27, 47 (1986).
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were before the event. Without such a conferral of continuous
identity, we cannot affirm popular sovereignty.
Popular sovereignty signifies what Lincoln said (although he
may not have meant his phrase in just our sense): government of
the people not only for the people but by the people. It signifies
self-government, the condition of a people living under a regime
of higher law, of constitutional essentials, that they themselves
make or adopt. Popular sovereignty, accordingly, conceives of
higher lawmaking events as deliberate acts of a capital-P People
legislating.
What is more, the idea envisions a People legislating not
only to the official agents-congresses, presidents, courtswhom they constitute by their higher lawmaking acts, but to
themselves as the self-same (self-governing) People as those who
legislate. This point-that the People sovereignly conceived as
giving law must be identically and therefore sovereignly conceived as taking law-is crucial to the exposition, so I'm going to
pause over it for a moment.
A People legislating a constitution legislate to themselves,
qua People. They do so at least insomuch as every constitution
(worthy of the name) is a law containing a binding rule about
how itself (including the rule of which we just now speak) may be
revised. In the Constitution of the United States, this rule-saving the views of the Yale non-exclusivistS2t-is Article V, requiring (in several alternative permutations) concurrent
supermajorities of both houses of Congress to propose an
amendment, or of the states to instigate a convention for proposing amendments, and then a supermajority of state legislatures or
ratifying conventions to ratify a proposed amendment. Apparently, then, there is a dimension of political freedom that we both
attribute to the chartering People (represented as the authors
and ratifiers of Article V) and deny to the People as thus
chartered-that is, the freedom to decide upon procedures of
higher lawmaking. The charterers ("We the People of the United
States") seem to stand, then, on a different plane of authority
from the chartered ("our posterity"), as creators to creatures.
How is it possible to construe such an event as one of selfgovernment?
There are possibility conditions for this, I now want to suggest, but they are stringent. For a People to be self-governing
21. See, e.g., Bruce Ackennan, Higher Lawmaking, in Levinson, Responding to Imperfection at 63 (cited in note 1); Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutionalism in the United States:
From Theory to Politics in id. at 89.
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means for them to legislate to themselves as the self-same People
as those who legislate. This means that the lawmaking act emanates from a People whose collective character or "political identity" (to use Bruce Ackerman's nice term) not only continues
through the process of enactment undissolved and self-identical
but also, by the same token, pre-exists the process.22
We need to say, then, what it is we think confers political
identities on empirical human aggregates, identities of a sort that
allows us to check for the sameness of the identities of the People
who lay down constitutional law and the People to whom it is
laid down. What do we think this people-constituting, identityfixing factor could possibly be? Must it not finally come down to
an attitude of expectation or commitment shared by constituent
members of the putative capital-P People? Of expectation of the
presence among them of some substantially contentful normative
like-mindedness, or at the very least of commitment to searching
out the possibility of this? An expectation of, or commitment to,
some cultural or dispositional or experiential commonality from
which they can together try to distill some substantially contentful idea of political reason or right?
Think, now, about how matters look from the standpoint of
the People on the downstream side, so to speak, of an event of
higher lawmaking. As a self-governing people, they cannot accept law from anyone save ... themselves. But it seems they can
know themselves as themselves-can know themselves as, so to
speak, a collective political self-only by knowing themselves as
a group of sharers, joint participants in some already present,
contentful idea, or proto-idea, of political reason or right. This
means they can know their lawgivers as legitimate-as sharing
political identity with them-only through the lawgivers' perceived or supposed participation in some political-regulative idea
that's sufficiently distinct to be identifiable-identifiable, that is,
as the same one as theirs. What we're saying here, in effect, is
that a population's conception of itself as self-governing, as legislating law to itself, depends on its sense of its members as, in their
higher lawmaking acts, commonly and constantly inspired by and
aspiring to some distinct regulative idea of political justice and
right, but an idea that itself has sprung from the politics of the
self-same self-governing People.
22. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 204 (Belknap Press, 1991).
writes, it seems to me paradoxically, of "an entire People ... break[ing] with
Its past, and construct[ing] a new political identity for itself."
~ckennan
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What I believe has now been established is this. Constitutional democrats attribute higher lawmaking to "the People
themselves,"23 conceived as self-governing; and it's precisely because they do so that they cannot ever conceive higher lawmaking either as total revolution or as writing on a clean slate. To
put the matter in a somewhat different way: Higher lawmaking is
always, in constitutional-democratic concept, a product of a
framed political interaction, an interaction framed by some already present, politically grounded, idea of political reason or
right.
IV. THE PEOPLE'S COURT
Let us now ask: Is this political-normative idea that constitutional democrats can't help thinking must frame and regulate
every Gustified) event of higher lawmaking by the People properly called an instance of law? We approach the question indirectly, by noticing that a "yes" answer carries with it certain oddlooking implications, and then to trying to figure out how we
might be able to make sufficient sense of these implications to
entertain seriously the premise from which they spring.
To start to see what these odd-looking implications are, we
can recur to our illustrative case. The scheme of American constitutional essentials operative today protects some measure of
freedom on a pregnant woman's part to control her pregnancy.
This is now a settled component of the scheme, at least according
to the prevailing view in Casey. Imagine, now, a reversal of this
component by a so-called "human life" constitutional amendment, duly enacted by one of the procedures provided by Article
V of the Constitution. Since a part of our business here is coming to terms with the idea of popular sovereignty, we shall regard
the amendment, as that idea requires, as undoubtedly an act of
the People themselves.
Suppose, now, that we give the name "law" to the politicalnormative idea that (according to my foregoing exposition) constitutional democrats think must be there, in place, to regulate
every instance of higher lawmaking by the People. Then it seems
we would have to regard our human life amendment as not only
an expression of the People's legislative will but as also, at the
same time, the People's rendition of something like a judgment
23.
22).

See The Federalist No. 40; Ackerman, We the People at 177-78, 192 (cited in note

1995]

ALWAYS UNDER LAW

243

at law.24 This conjunction of legislation and adjudication is unusual, but is it unthinkable? Could we not see the higher-law enactment-the constitutional amendment-issuing as a kind of
remedy from a legal decision, bound and determined by legal argument presented to the People's court?
There immediately appears a fairly glaring trouble with this
construction of the case, which we can present in terms provided
by Bruce Ackerman. The amendment would plainly be meant as
an alteration in the country's concretely operative scheme of
higher law, a reversal of the Casey settlement. The amendment
would furthermore have, at least potentially, a palpable degree
of the quality that Ackerman calls transformative. Its seismic effects across a broad swathe of the higher law could tum out to be
considerable. Now, "transformation" is a brave term-one well
suited, one might say, to sovereignty. "Transformation" insinuates, in Ackerman's language, a "radical break" from the political past, a "drastic change," a new beginning.25
But according to Ackerman and many others, legal arguments are demands for fidelity to a political past-meaning,
wherever and insofar as the People are supposed sovereign, fidelity to the past lawmaking acts of the People.z6 The paradigmatic
addressee of a legal argument is a court staffed by judges, and
judges in popular-sovereignty theory are agents of the People
whose special trust is "preservation" of the People's past higher
lawmaking. (Just ask Alexander Hamiltonz1 or John Marshallzs.)
On these terms, it would seem, there cannot be such a thing as a
24. There surely is some affinity between John Rawls's notion of public reason, see
Rawls, Polilical Liberalism Lecture VI at 212-54 (cited in note 4}, and the notion I'm
exploring here of a politically grounded "law" that (I say} constitutional democracy supposes higher lawmaking by the People to be always under. A friend who read this asked
whether there's any conflict between Rawls's remark that the restraints or obligations of
public reason are not a matter of law (see id. at 213), and my suggestion that the higherlawmaking People are supposed to be rendering something like a judgment at law. I
don't think so. Rawls means to say, I believe, that there is no positive legal obligation on
citizens to judge public questions by and only by the light of public reason; public reason
is "an ideal conception of citizenship," id., not a subsisting legal obligation. There is nothing to the contrary in my unfolding account of constitutional democratic political thought.
According to my account, it's not (in this thought} a matter of subsisting legal duty that
the People treat questions of the constitutional essentials as matters of judgment under a
standard; it's rather a (very possibly counterfactual} presupposition of the idea of the
justified character of the governmental order.
25. See, e.g., Ackerman, We the People at 204-05 (cited in note 22}.
26. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constilution,
93 Yale L.J. 1013, 1053, 1070-71 (1984}.
'2:7. See The Federalist No. 78.
28. See Marbury v. Madis_on.

244

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 12:227

legal argument to justify potentially transformative higher law
changes.
Do we move too fast? Here is one possibility I suppose we
ought to consider: Perhaps it's both conceivable and acceptable
for a legal argument to aim at a transformative result, even understanding legality as fidelity to popular sovereignty, as long as
the addressees of the argument-the judges in the case (so to
speak)-are the People themselves and not their subordinate judicial agents. But that would still leave the question of what it
would mean, then, to call the motivating argument a legal one.
What analogy, what noteworthy similarity, would we be perceiving between judicial decision in a constitutional case and the
higher-law resolutions of the People themselves?
Apparently, the noteworthy similarity would have to be that
both judicial decision and popular higher lawmaking are ideally
meant to depend upon exercises of judgment according to an ascertainable, politically grounded standard of right. Now, one
might suggest that a name for a publicly ascertainable, politically
pedigreed standard of right to govern debate over what is now to
be done politically is law; and argument appealing to such a standard would, then, be legal argument.
But of course this doesn't resolve our difficulty, it only restates it. The difficulty comes in trying to attribute to a single act
of higher lawmaking the two properties of fidelity (legality) and
freedom (transformativity). If by calling the act a legal one we
mean it is to be approached and construed as a collective exercise
of judgment under a pre-existent governing standard that's somehow already politically endorsed as a part of the higher law, then
to speak in the same breath of transformation-or even, more
modestly, alteration or change-is to fail to report with precision
what is going on. Isn't it?
Well, perhaps not. Perhaps not, if we understand "transformation" in a relative sense. It is relative to what I'll call the
"layer" of constitutional law that's operative at any given moment for the practices of officials and citizens. For we've now
begun, in effect, to think of constitutional law as multi-layered, as
itself containing relatively "lower" and "higher" layers. So that
one can always argue by appeal to a higher layer-to some more
ultimate (alleged) precept or precepts of American political morality, for which the Constitution stands and which accordingly
carry the force of law-in defense of some projected "transformation" of the lower, currently operative legal layer.
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We would find ourselves, then, with an account of the argument for the "human life" amendment-call it the "amendment
under law" account-running roughly as follows:
"Right now, in the post-Casey moment, we have in force an
operative layer of constitutional law containing, as one component, a measure of protection for the procreative freedoms of
pregnant women. Such is the higher law that right now binds
and obligates the subordinate official agents of the sovereign
People, judges of course included. But there is also right now
awaiting recognition [so would run this account] a higher,
more ultimate layer of constitutional principle that, if recognized, would warrant a contrary legal conclusion. This higher
layer of constitutional principle is itself cognizable as binding
law. It is, however, thus cognizable only by one court, the
court of the People acting by way of constitutional amendment. Pending such a cognition by the People, the currently
operative layer of constitutional law continues in force."

This sort of multi-legal-layer account would provide a way to
begin to make sense of the notion of a (fidelity-inspired) legal
argument or legal judgment, aiming at constitutional transformation. But whatever sense the account makes may prove fragile
when we start to follow up in earnest its implications.
For consider: However mistaken any of us might think the
judgment-of-higher-principle that formal adoption of a human
life amendment would represent (on the always-under-law account), no more than a tiny handful of us would dream of denying that this action lies within the subject-matter jurisdiction, so
to speak, of the People acting under Article V. Yet among those
of us who would thus freely concede this jurisdiction to the People, a sizeable fraction would also join the Casey plurality in denying it henceforth to the Supreme Court. How would we, then,
explain ourselves? If there is some respect in which the People,
acting within their rightful jurisdiction, can renovate constitutional essentials, and a parallel authorization is denied to judges
sworn to uphold the Constitution, then that seems to undermine
the suggestion that the People's higher lawmaking actions arealways ideally meant to be products of judgments governed by upper-layer constitutional principles.
But maybe it doesn't. A constitutional system might, for
various reasons, contain jurisdictional rules barring one or more
classes of tribunals from pursuing the demands of law all the way
up. Our system does contain such rules, most obviously its commonplace rules of intra-judicial hierarchy. Again to illustrate:
Almost everyone would agree that there was a period of time
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after 1973 when the Supreme Court quite properly held itself
open to legal argument aimed at persuading it to put aside, to
overrule, what it later came to call the central holding of Roe v.
Wade,z9 but that there never was a time when any lower federal
court could properly have entertained that possibility, independent of the Supreme Court's lead. This example suggests that
there may be some way to extend our "always under law" account of higher lawmaking to make the account explain why
some ministrations of upper-layer higher-law content are reserved to a tribunal apart from the Supreme Court, that of the
People themselves, while still construing what the People do,
whenever they lay hands on the higher law, as the rendition of
interpretative judgments.
V. JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION
Within the frame of an always-under-law account of higher
lawmaking, what could possibly explain special jurisdictional reservations to the People from professionally expert tribunals
sworn to render judgment according to law? The likeliest answer, I think, is practical doubts that interpretation of higher-law
norms can always be held securely distinct from selection or
identification of the norms themselves, or, in other words, practical doubts that acts of interpretation can always be held securely
distinct from acts of legislation.
Theory differentiates between acts of norm-origination and
acts of norm-interpretation; theory differentiates between originary discourses of justification and secondary discourses of application.3o If these theoretical differentiations were secure, and
experienced as secure, in actual constitutional-democratic practice, then it would seem that the following would be a necessary
and sufficient condition for popular sovereignty, for self-government by the People of a country: The people "themselves" are the
originators or the endorsers of all the norms composing the country's higher law. In order for popular self-government to exist or
be the case, originary questions would have to be reserved to the
People. By the same token, however, all questions of interpretation and application could be left to judicial or other subalterns
without compromising popular sovereignty.
See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2791 & passim.
See, e.g., JUrgen Habennas, Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of
Kont Apply to Discourse Ethics? in JUrgen Habennas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action 195, 206 (MIT Press, Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Nicholsen tr. 1990).
29.
30.
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What's striking about the account herein of the popular-sovereignty component in constitutional-democratic political
thought is that it doesn't at all play in that way. On the one
hand, according to this account, the People are not envisioned as
ever originating norms;3t the extension to the case of popular
higher-lawmaking of the always-under-law thesis says that the
People's higher-law ministrations are always interpretative,
never originary. On the other hand, according to this account,
the People's self-government is perceived as compromised when
subordinate officers Qudges) are allowed to enter certain reaches
of norm-interpretation; jurisdiction in these reaches is reserved
to the People. It seems, then, that this account implies a relativization-or perhaps a denial of the significance or
detectability in practice-of the origination/interpretation and
justification/application distinctions that theory posits.

31. Although, it must be conceded, all nonns are envisioned as having originated
with the People.

